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Jinjarak, Yothin—Foreign direct investment and macroeconomic risk
Motivated by the macroeconomic fluctuations and policy regime switches frequently observed in devel-
oping countries, this paper provides cross country-industry evidence on the links between a host country’s
macro risks and foreign direct investment (FDI) activities. For each industry I measure vertical FDI share as
a ratio of exports to a parent country relative to local sales by foreign affiliates. Using a panel sample from
1989 to 1999, I find that FDI activities of US multinationals in industries with higher share of vertical FDI
respond disproportionately more to negative effects of macro-level demand, supply, and sovereign risks.
However, when institutional quality and total FDI share of the host country are sufficiently low, the merits
of cross-industry vertical versus horizontal FDI in response to macro risks disappear. Journal of Compara-
tive Economics 35 (3) (2007) 509–519. Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University (NTU),
S3-B2A-06, Singapore 639798.
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1. Overview
What is the main driving force of foreign direct investment (FDI)? This paper adds to a se-
ries of literatures studying the association between institutions, macroeconomic risks, and FDI.1
* Fax: +65 67946303.
E-mail address: YJinjarak@ntu.edu.sg.
1 Another strand of literature focuses on static conditions under which vertical FDI is more efficient than horizontal
FDI. There, vertical FDI arises when a multinational firm fragments its production process internationally, locating each
stage of the production in the host country where it can be done at the least cost. Hummels et al. (2001) and Yi (2003)0147-5967/$ – see front matter © 2007 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. All
rights reserved.
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Share of vertical FDI across industries, US multinationals






Food and kindred products 0.042 5.0
Services 0.054 3.9
Other industries 0.056 5.3
Wholesale trade 0.066 1.9
Chemicals and allied products 0.077 9.0
Other manufacturing 0.128 8.5
Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.160 5.9
Petroleum− 0.161 16.6
Primary and fabricated metals 0.166 1.9
Machinery+ 0.207 2.8
Electronic and other electric equipment− 0.240 1.1
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 0.320 4.2
Mining+ 0.368 2.9
Industrial machinery and equipment− 0.395 9.1
Transportation equipment 0.555 10.9
Computer and electronic products+ 0.580 8.8
Difference in Vertical FDI Share 0.443
Notes. +(−) codifies industries started (stopped) reporting in the B.E.A. surveys from year 1999 on. Some industries
which the survey started reporting in 1999 are closely related to some pre-1999 industries: “Industrial machinery and
equipment” (pre-1999), “Machinery” (post-1999), and “Computer and electronic products (post-1999); “Electronic and
other electric equipment” (pre-1999) and “Electrical equipment, appliances, components” (post-1999). Difference in
Vertical FDI Share is the average difference between the ratios of industries located below the 25th percentile and the
ratios of industries located above the 75th.
In Aizenman and Marion (2004), a simple real-option model of FDI is supported by country-
level evidence that macroeconomic volatility has larger effects on vertical FDI than horizontal
FDI. Delving into the industry level, I investigate whether a priori FDI structure—vertical versus
horizontal—determines the association between FDI activity and macro-level risks. If so, neg-
ative effects of risks in a host country on FDI activity ex post then not only exist but are also
dependent on the share of vertical FDI across industries.
Using a sample of activity by US multinationals, Table 1 reports for each industry a vertical
FDI share, measured by the level exported back to US divided by local sales.2 To tabulate the
numbers, it is assumed that production technology underlying the share of horizontal versus
show that vertical FDI has emerged as another explanation to the growth of world trade. Carr et al. (2001) show that the
choice between vertical and horizontal FDI depends on country characteristics, such as relative size, relative endowment,
and investment costs. See also Braconier et al. (2005), Davies (2003), Hanson et al. (2005), and Waldkirch (2006) for the
comparative-advantage consideration of vertical FDI.
2 This method follows Hanson et al. (2002) and Aizenman and Marion (2004). I measure the output of vertical produc-
tion as foreign affiliates’ exports to the parent firm, assuming that these exports represent intermediate goods requiring
further processing in the parent country. The output of horizontal production is measured by the affiliates’ sales in the
local market where the affiliates operate, assuming that these are sales of final goods. This measure sums together the
affiliates’ exports that sent back to the parent firm as in Helpman (1984), but not that sent to other countries (export
platform FDI) as in Ekholm et al. (2003). This measure of vertical FDI is a narrow version and coefficient estimates
provide a lower bound of its effects.
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across industries is apparent: a ratio of exports back to US relative to local sales by foreign
affiliates of industries below the 25th percentile (Utilities, Information, Food, Services) is, on
average, 44 percent smaller than that of industries above the 75th percentile (Mining, Industrial
Machinery, Transportation Equipment, and Computer Products). In the next section, I investigate
empirically the implication of this dissimilarity by projecting cross country-industry patterns of
FDI activity onto a vector of macro risks.
2. Estimation
To quantify the differential impact of macro risks on vertical versus horizontal FDI activities,
I estimate the following equation:
FDI Activity of Industry j in Host Country k
= Constant + β1...m · Country Indicators + βm+1...n · Industry Indicators
+ βn+1 · (Host Country k’s Share of Total Sales in industry j in 1989)
+ βn+2 · [Vertical FDI of Industry j × Macro Risk in Host Country k] + εj,k
where β’s are coefficient estimates. I use dummy variables to control for country and industry
time-invariant unobserved characteristics. For this econometric specification, a negative and sta-
tistically significant βn+2 indicates that FDI activities of industries with higher share of vertical
FDI respond more adversely to macro risks in a host country. The advantage of this setting is that
it makes predictions about within-country differences between industries based on the interaction
between country and industry characteristics. It should also be less subjected to omitted variable
bias and model misspecification.4
I use the 1989, 1994, and 1999 benchmark surveys on US multinational activities compiled
by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Table 2 provides a list of countries, together with
their share and level of vertical FDI. Countries in the top half of the table witness, on average,
more than 25 billion USD (in 1995$) of total sales generated by affiliates of US multinationals. In
contrast, the bottom half of Table 2 shares just a little below 10 percent of total sales.5 This feature
of the sample is useful for guiding the robustness check. Although there is a presumption that
horizontal FDI should dominate in large destinations, high-income, industrial countries, I find in
this sample set that the average share of vertical FDI is 19 percent for both large and small hosts
(excluding Barbados, Bermuda, Netherlands Antilles, Nigeria, and UAE as outliers).
3 If the production technology determining vertical FDI does not carry over to all foreign affiliates and changes fre-
quently over time, the choice of export versus FDI becomes an important consideration. For studies on export versus
FDI, see for example Brainard (1997), Grossman and Helpman (2004), and Helpman et al. (2004). On the insensitivity
of production technology to host-country conditions, see for example Morley and Smith (1977).
4 Rajan and Zingales (1998) use similar empirical approach to study whether industrial sectors that are relatively more
in need of external finance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more-developed financial markets.
5 Using the total sales numbers is admittedly a crude approximation. The immediate concern is transfer pricing.
Swenson (2001) finds an association between foreign corporate tax rates and the reported transaction prices between
parent firms and foreign affiliates. Because of data availability, it is difficult to measure cross industry-country differ-
ences in transfer-pricing manipulation over time. I treat this distortion as a random component.
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Total sales by affiliates of US multinationals, 1989–1999
Host country US$bn Country share (%) Exports back to USLocal sales
United Kingdom 734.7 15.47 0.07
Canada 665.9 14.02 0.37
Germany 480.2 10.11 0.04
France 301.1 6.34 0.04
Japan 282.7 5.95 0.05
Netherlands 235.9 4.97 0.07
Italy 172.6 3.64 0.04
Switzerland 160.1 3.37 0.22
Australia 143.9 3.03 0.04
Singapore 139.3 2.93 0.88
Mexico 136.0 2.86 0.41
Belgium 129.2 2.72 0.09
Brazil 122.5 2.58 0.07
Spain 104.9 2.21 0.03
Hong Kong 94.0 1.98 0.34
Ireland 87.6 1.85 0.31
Sweden 47.4 1.00 0.09
Bermuda 41.8 0.88 5.06
Taiwan 39.5 0.83 0.21
Malaysia 38.7 0.81 0.55
Argentina 38.2 0.81 0.03
Norway 31.5 0.66 0.13
Thailand 29.9 0.63 0.18
Austria 29.8 0.63 0.14
Indonesia 24.1 0.51 0.26
China 22.7 0.48 0.09
Denmark 20.2 0.43 0.06
Korea 19.1 0.40 0.16
Colombia 19.1 0.40 0.08
Portugal 18.4 0.39 0.01
Venezuela 18.2 0.38 0.02
Philippines 16.8 0.35 0.17
Chile 16.2 0.34 0.10
New Zealand 14.9 0.31 0.02
South Africa 14.4 0.30 0.01
Turkey 13.2 0.28 0.02
Finland 12.3 0.26 0.04
Nigeria 9.8 0.21 2.64
Greece 9.2 0.19 0.01
Saudi Arabia 8.4 0.18 0.02
Poland 7.7 0.16 0.01
Israel 7.7 0.16 0.59
United Arab Emirates 7.3 0.15 1.33
Peru 7.2 0.15 0.12
Panama 6.6 0.14 0.38
Hungary 6.4 0.13 0.22
Barbados 5.7 0.12 2.19
India 5.7 0.12 0.03
Costa Rica 4.8 0.10 0.78
Dominican Republic 4.7 0.10 0.68
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Host country US$bn Country share (%) Exports back to USLocal sales
Czech Republic 4.4 0.09 0.01
Netherlands Antilles 4.0 0.08 8.13
Honduras 3.6 0.08 0.14
Ecuador 2.8 0.06 0.45
Jamaica 2.5 0.05 0.63
Bahamas 1.8 0.04 0.23
Guatemala 1.7 0.03 0.06
Table 3
Summary and correlations of macro risks
Variable Value-added risk Labor-strike risk Demand risk Sovereign risk
Summary
Observations 468 468 468 468
Mean 0.03 0.43 0.03 5.07
Standard deviation 0.02 0.32 0.03 1.69
Minimum 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00
Maximum 0.10 1.55 0.18 8.00
Correlations
a Value-added risk 1.00
b Labor-strike risk 0.05 1.00
c Demand risk 0.12 0.12 1.00
d Sovereign risk −0.20 0.04 0.26 1.00
The estimation covers three measures of FDI activity: Total Assets, Net Property, and Em-
ployee Compensation.6 Following the theoretical model of Aizenman and Marion (2004), there
are broadly three types of macro-level uncertainty: demand, supply, and sovereign risks. I mea-
sure demand risk by coefficient of variation of monthly real effective exchange rates of a host
country.7 There are two measures of supply risk: coefficient of variation of value added and vari-
ation in the number of labor market strikes and lockouts in a host country. I use a numerical
assessment of investment profiles to measure sovereign risk. The summary and correlations of
macro risks are provided in Table 3. The risk variables have positive but small correlations (ex-
cept for a negative correlation between value-added risk and sovereign risk). The final sample
covers eighteen industries and thirty-seven host countries. The Appendix provides details on data
source and construction of these variables.
6 Aizenman (2003) proposes that a negative association between Employee Compensation and uncertainty may stem
from production diversification that increases the responsiveness of the multinational employment to host country’s
productivity shocks (the multinational channels its employment from the more to less volatile location).
7 Beyond the scope of this paper is whether the demand risk via real exchange rate channel arises from shocks in the
affiliate’s parent country or host country. See Russ (2007) for some further treatment. Aizenman and Marion (2004) use
terms of trade volatility as a measure of demand uncertainty. Note that for periods of significant and persistent exchange-
rate changes, host-country currency can influence FDI. For example, Blonigen (1997) finds that real dollar depreciations
make Japanese acquisitions more likely in US industries, particularly those which more likely have firm-specific assets.
Froot and Stein (1991) find that a depreciation of the host-country currency may systematically lower the relative wealth
of domestic agents and lead to foreign acquisition of domestic assets. See also Klein and Rosengren (1994) and Rangan
and Lawrence (1993).
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Macro-level risks and measures of FDI activity
Affiliate
activities
Interaction of Exports back to USLocal sales Obs. R
2
× Supply risk × Demand risk × Sovereign risk
Value added Labor strikes
I. Full Sample
A −43.9 (18.7)** −2.5 (1.5)* −1.7 (8.0) −0.7 (0.3)** 468 0.71
B −45.5 (19.0)** −2.8 (1.4)* 0.1 (8.0) −0.5 (0.3)* 468 0.81
C −38.6 (15.6)** −2.1 (1.2)* 5.9 (7.6) −0.5 (0.2)* 468 0.76
II. Total Affiliate Sales  25 billion USD
A −144.9 (62.6)** −4.3 (3.4) −4.3 (27.6) −1.5 (0.7)** 307 0.67
B −163.7 (58.3)*** −6.1 (3.0)** 10.2 (27.1) −1.4 (0.6)** 307 0.78
C −112.8 (46.2)** −5.3 (2.5)** 30.0 (27.8) −1.0 (0.4)** 307 0.72
III. Total Affiliate Sales < 25 billion USD
A −5.5 (3.5) −0.1 (0.2) 1.2 (1.1) −0.0 (0.0) 161 0.86
B −5.2 (3.5) −0.2 (0.3) 1.7 (1.1) −0.1 (0.1) 161 0.81
C −7.4 (4.9) 0.2 (0.3) 1.9 (1.7) −0.1 (0.1) 161 0.78
Notes. The dependent variables are measures of FDI activity share of US multinationals for each industry in each host
country: A is total assets, B is employee compensation, C is net property. Vertical FDI share is the ratio of Exports
back to US relative to Local Sales from 1989 to 1999. The interaction variable is a product of vertical FDI share and
macro-level risk. Supply risks are volatility of value added and variation in the number of labor market strikes. Demand
risk is volatility of real exchange rates. Sovereign risk is a score on investment profile. All regressions include both host
country and industry fixed effects, and host country’s share of total sales in the industry in 1989 (coefficient estimates
not reported). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Idem, 5%.
*** Idem, 1%.
Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates. Because the econometric specification controls for
country-specific and industry-specific effects, those being identified are the effects relative to
variables that vary both cross host countries and cross industries. Table 4 thus reports only the
coefficients of interaction measures of macro risks. For the full sample reported in Panel I, we can
see that supply and sovereign risks have larger effects on the total assets of industries with higher
share of vertical FDI, while the demand risk lacks statistical power in explaining any differential
impact. A host country’s share of Total Sales in industry in 1989 (coefficient not reported) is
positive and statistically significant. Further, these findings apply to all three accounts of FDI
activity.8
To provide a robustness check, I take on a sample feature that half of the countries register less
than 0.5 percent or 25 billion USD of total US FDI. Short of macroeconomic data, the estimation
cannot confront with censoring, which also requires data points for countries with zero US FDI
(those not included in Table 2). By disregarding countries that are unable to attract US FDI, we
8 If there are technological reasons that an industry relies on vertical FDI more than other industries, and these techno-
logical differences persist for all foreign affiliates across host countries over periods under consideration, we can consider
the industry’s dependence on vertical FDI applicable to all FDI destinations. All we really need is that statements of the
following sort hold: If Computer Products industry requires more vertical FDI in its production structure than Food in-
dustry from 1989–1999, FDI activity by the foreign affiliates in Computer Products industry responds disproportionately
more than Food industry to the negative effects of macro risks in host countries.
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and III of Table 4 the regression results using the 25 billion USD cutoff. We can see that the
vertical-versus-horizontal differential impact of macro risks is not applicable to those smaller-
share destinations. The merits of cross-industry vertical versus horizontal FDI in response to
macro-level risks apply only to a subset of medium and large host-country destinations.
To a degree, the results are in line with theory and country-level evidence in Aizenman and
Marion (2004): at industry-level, we also see in a subset of FDI destinations that supply and sov-
ereign risks have more deleterious impact on vertical FDI, whereas demand risk discourages both
vertical and horizontal production modes. The estimation also performs quite well, explaining
67–86 percent of variation in the data. One method in which we can quantify economic signif-
icance of the coefficient estimates is as follows. Industries above the 75th percentile of vertical
FDI share (average = 0.47) include Mining, Industrial Machinery, Transportation Equipment,
and Computer Products. Industries below the 25th percentile (average = 0.03) are Utilities, In-
formation, Food, and Services. A one standard deviation change of sovereign risk is 1.7 score
on host-country’s investment profile. If we set the host country’s initial share of total sales at its
overall mean, the coefficient estimate on sovereign risk then predicts that total assets of the higher
vertical-FDI share group (the 75th percentile) should adversely respond 0.52 percent more than
the lower share group. Summing together the negative effects of supply, demand, and sovereign
risks on the total assets, a differential of 1.24 percent is found. In comparison, the size of total
assets for the top half of Table 2 is, on average, 88 billion USD. Therefore, a differential of 1.24
percent is significant. Fig. 1 provides a summary of the vertical-versus-horizontal differential
response of FDI activity to macro risks.
3. Discussion
Interaction between contractual incompleteness and uncertainty plays a central role in the
evaluation of the relative costs of governance through market-based bilateral contracts versus
governance through internal organizations (Joskow, 2005). Assuming there is industry-specific
uncertainty that drives vertical FDI, the results reported here can then be interpreted as in-
creases in macroeconomic risks having stronger effects when the industry-specific uncertainty
is small. In a longer sample, the estimation may also be exposed to multicollinearity as produc-
tivity shocks tend to account for the long-run movements in real exchange rate fluctuations by
Balassa–Samuelson’s (Alexius, 2005). Another reservation on the regression results is that the
flow and stock of US FDI data can provide rough approximations to country distributions of FDI
sources and destinations, but are poor approximations to industry distributions of FDI and to
changes over time in country and industry distributions (Lipsey, 2007).
While there is much at stake in eliminating macro risks, to understand the means to the end
poses quite a challenge. Consider, for example, the supply risk. A negative association between
the risk of labor strikes and FDI activity casts doubt on the welfare implication of centralized
versus decentralized wage setting regimes (Leahy and Montagna, 2000). As for demand risk
generated by the volatility of real exchange rates, a risk considered relatively easy to fix, choosing
an exchange rate regime as a policy prescription to eliminate it may actually miss the target
and is likely to be of second order importance to the development of good fiscal, financial, and
monetary institutions (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003). At a broader level, we can consider the findings
in this paper as a first attempt at understanding the role of policy coordination as countries try
to attract new investments and extract benefits from market potential (Barrell and Pain, 1999;
516 Y. Jinjarak / Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007) 509–519Notes. Differential FDI Activity measures in percentage how much larger an industry above the 75th percentile level
of vertical FDI share responds negatively with respect to an industry below a 25th percentile level when it faces a one
standard deviation change of macro-level risks. Each bar is the product of coefficient estimate (−0.7 for FDI Activity
on Sovereign Risk) and standard deviation of explanatory variable (1.7 score for Sovereign Risk), multiplied by a differ-
ence in vertical FDI share between industries at the 75th and 25th percentile (0.44). Missing bars represent statistically
insignificant coefficient estimates.
Fig. 1. One standard deviation change of risks and differential in FDI activity
Petroulas, in press). Hence, the three types of macro risks identified here can be considered as
measurable stochastic attributes of structural and institutional inefficiencies facing policymakers.
Of the 234 countries recognized by the United Nations,9 only a quarter attracts FDI from US
multinationals. In our sample of 57 FDI destinations, those located below the 25th percentile of
total FDI share have investment profiles that are one standard deviation riskier than those located
above the 75th percentile. Contrasting destinations according to their total FDI share, vertical-
versus-horizontal differential impact of macro risks turns out to not be applicable to smaller-share
destinations, suggesting that FDI activity of both types are equally vulnerable to macro risks in
countries with low institution qualities. When the institutional quality of a country is sufficiently
low, US multinationals are hardly interested in direct foreign investment. Information from those
countries with zero US FDI, however, may be useful for understanding international investment
flows. Exploring this feature of the data, which is largely being ignored in current literature, is
left for future works.10
9 Based on the latest listing on the United Nations web site, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49alpha.htm.
10 See Helpman et al. (2007) in the context of international trade flows.
Y. Jinjarak / Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007) 509–519 517For developing countries, consumer potentials, abundant natural resources, and labor cost
advantages are all attractive for FDI (Hanson et al., 2002). On the other hand, developing coun-
tries are characterized by larger macroeconomic fluctuations and more frequent policy regime
switches than industrial countries (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). That these stylized facts of macro
risks across countries is a driving factor to the sensitivity of vertical versus horizontal FDI ac-
tivity corroborates the institutional consideration of international allocation of resources. Much
progress has been made on linking institutional analysis to international trade; Anderson and
Marcouiller (2002), Berkowitz et al. (2006), Blomberg and Hess (2006), Greif (1992), Levchenko
(in press), Marin and Schnitzer (2002), Nunn (2007), Rauch (1999), Rodrik et al. (2004), and
Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005). As a corollary to cross-border trading in goods in the presence of
institutional risks, multinationals likewise face a risk that their investment will be expropriated
for the simple reason that international contracts are practically impossible to enforce (Thomas
and Worral, 1993). Greaney (2003) proposes that the observed trade frictions between countries,
such as the occasional US versus Japan row, are a result of asymmetric trade and investment
flows that may stem from differences in the strength of business and social networks in interna-
tional trade and FDI. On the empirical front, Aizenman and Spiegel (2006) find that institutional
efficiency is positively associated with the ratio of subsequent foreign direct investment flows to
both gross fixed capital formation and to private investment. As the theoretical and empirics of
multinational firms are not as well developed as other areas of international economics, a combi-
nation of lessons drawn from international trade with comparative institutional analysis applying
to FDI is a promising direction for future research.
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Appendix A
FDI Activity: survey data over five-year interval (1989, 1994, and 1999) compiled by
the BEA’s US Direct Investment Abroad (from http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#
omc). Nominal values are deflated by the US GDP deflator (base year = 1995; US GDP deflator
is the implicit price deflator for Gross Domestic Product from the National Income and Prod-
uct Accounts at the BEA, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/). Three measures of FDI
activity share by foreign affiliates are: Total assets [BEA Table III.B5], Compensation of em-
ployees [BEA Table III.H5], and Net property, plant, and equipment [BEA Table III.B7]. BEA
changed industry classification in 1999. Some of the industries that the survey started reporting
in 1999 are closely related to some pre-1999 industries. These include “Industrial machinery
and equipment” (pre-1999), “Machinery” (post-1999), and “Computer and electronic products”
(post-1999); “Electronic and other electric equipment” (pre-1999) and “Electrical equipment,
appliances, components” (post-1999).
Vertical FDI Share: ratio of foreign affiliates’ exports back to US relative to local sales for
each industry, averaged over the period 1989–1999. Exports are sales by foreign affiliates to the
US [BEA Table III.F4]. Local sales are sales by foreign affiliates to the local market in host
country [BEA Table III.F7].
Supply Risks: (i) volatility of value added of host country, measured by lagged three years
coefficient of variation of annual gross value added indices; (ii) variation in the number of labor
518 Y. Jinjarak / Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007) 509–519market strikes and lockouts in host countries, measured by coefficient of variation over the cur-
rent and past five years. The types of strikes and lockouts covered are constitutional or official,
unofficial, political or protest, sympathetic and general or widespread strikes and lockouts, and
any other forms of action due to labor disputes, e.g. sit-ins, working to rule, go-slows and over-
time bans. Source: International Labor Organization’s LABORSTA (from http://laborsta.ilo.org/).
Demand Risk: volatility of real effective exchange rates, measured by coefficient of variation
of monthly values. Source: JP Morgan’s real broad effective exchange rate indices from DataS-
tream.
Sovereign Risk: investment profile, measured by a numerical assessment on three factors re-
lating to investment risks in host country: (1) viability of contracts/expropriation; (2) profits
repatriation; (3) payments delays. Countries are ranked monthly on a 0–12 scale, with a higher
value indicating lower risk. The reported scores have been rescaled by subtracting from 12 so
that a higher value indicates a greater sovereign risk. Source: International Country Risk Guide,
Political Risk Services Group (from http://www.prsgroup.com/).
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